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Abstract— Cooperation between wireless network nodes is a
promising technique for improving the physical layer security of
wireless transmission, in terms of secrecy capacity, in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing physical layer security
literature answered the question “what are the link-level secrecy
capacity gains from cooperation?”, this paper attempts to answer
the question of “how to achieve those gains in a practical decen-
tralized wireless network and in the presence of a secrecy capacity
cost for information exchange?”. For this purpose, we model the
physical layer security cooperation problem as a coalitional game
with non-transferable utility and propose a distributed algorithm
for coalition formation. Through the proposed algorithm, the
wireless users can autonomously cooperate and self-organize into
disjoint independent coalitions, while maximizing their secrecy
capacity taking into account the security costs during information
exchange. We analyze the resulting coalitional structures, discuss
their properties, and study how the users can self-adapt the network
topology to environmental changes such as mobility. Simulation
results show that the proposed algorithm allows the users to
cooperate and self-organize while improving the average secrecy
capacity per user up to 25.32% relative to the non-cooperative
case.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, security in wireless networks has
been mainly considered at higher layers using various techniques
such as cryptography. However, with the emergence of ad hoc
and decentralized networks [1], [2], higher-layer techniques such
as encryption are complex and hard to implement. Therefore,
there has been a recent attention on studying the fundamental
ability of the physical layer (PHY) to provide secure wireless
communication. The main idea is to exploit the wireless channel
PHY characteristics such as fading or noise for improving the
reliability of wireless transmission. While these characteristics
have always been seen as impairments, PHY layer security stud-
ies can utilize these characteristics for improving the security and
reliability of wireless communication systems. This reliability
is quantified by the secrecy capacity, which is defined as the
maximum rate of secret information sent from a wireless node
to its destination in the presence of eavesdroppers. The study of
this security aspect began with the pioneering work of Wyner
over the wire-tap channel [3] which showed that communicating
data can be done in a secure manner without relying on any
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form of encryption such as secret keys. This work was followed
up in [4], [5] for the scalar Gaussian wire-tap channel and the
broadcast channel, respectively.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in carrying
out these studies unto the wireless and the multi-user channels
[6–11]. For instance, in [6] and [7], the authors study the secrecy
capacity region for both the Gaussian and the fading broadcast
channels and propose optimal power allocation strategies. In
[8], the secrecy level in multiple access channels from a link-
level perspective is studied. Further, multiple antenna systems
have been proposed in [9], [11] for ensuring a non-zero secrecy
capacity, notably when the channel between the source and the
destination is worse than the channel between the source and
the eavesdroppers. Due to the size limitations of mobile devices,
cooperation has been recently investigated as a practical way to
achieve the multiple antenna gains [12]. In this context, the work
in [10] investigates, through a two stage algorithm, the secrecy
capacity gains (with no cost) resulting from the cooperation
between a single cluster consisting of one source node and a
number of relays. In this work, they investigate how a group
of single antenna users can collaborate, by using beamforming
(with no cost for cooperation), for improving their secrecy capac-
ity. Briefly, the majority of the existing literature is devoted to the
information theoretic analysis of link-level performance gains
of secure communications with no information exchange cost,
notably when a source node cooperate with some relays such
as in [10]. No work seems to have investigated how a number
of users, each with its own data, can interact and cooperate at
network-wide level to improve their secrecy capacity and provide
PHY security for their wireless transmission.
The main contribution of this work is to propose distributed
cooperation strategies, through coalitional game theory, which
allow to study the interactions between a network of users that
seek to secure their communication through cooperation in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Another major contribution
is to study the impact on the network topology and dynamics of
the inherent trade off that exists between the PHY security co-
operation gains in terms of secrecy capacity and the information
exchange costs. In other words, while the earlier work answered
the question “what are the secrecy capacity gains from coopera-
tion?”, here, we seek to answer the question of “how to achieve
those gains in a practical decentralized wireless network and in
the presence of a cost for information exchange?”. We model
Fig. 1. System Model for Physical Layer Security Coalitional Game.
the problem as a non-transferable coalitional game and propose a
distributed algorithm for autonomous coalition formation based
on well suited concepts from cooperative games. Through the
proposed algorithm, each user autonomously decides to form or
break a coalition for maximizing its utility in terms of secrecy
capacity while accounting for the loss of secrecy capacity
during information exchange. We show that independent disjoint
coalitions form in the network, due to the cooperation cost, and
we study their properties. Through simulations, we assess the
performance of the proposed algorithm, investigate the network
topology, and show how the users can self-organize and adapt the
topology to mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed
algorithm allows the users to cooperate and self-organize while
improving the average secrecy capacity per user up to 25.32%
relative to the non-cooperative case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model. Section III presents the game for-
mulation and properties. In Section IV we devise the coalition
formation algorithm. Simulation results are presented and ana-
lyzed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section
VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network having N transmitters (e.g. mobile users)
sending data to M receivers (destinations) in the presence of K
eavesdroppers that seek to tap into the transmission of the users.
Users, receivers and eavesdroppers are unidirectional-single-
antenna nodes. We define N = {1, . . . , N}, M = {1, . . . ,M}
and K = {1, . . . ,K} as the sets of users, destinations, and
eavesdroppers, respectively. In this work, we consider only
the case of multiple eavesdroppers, hence, we have K > 1.
Furthermore, let hi,mi denote the complex baseband channel
gain between user i ∈ N and its destination mi ∈ M and gi,k
denote the channel gain between user i ∈ N and eavesdropper
k ∈ K. We consider a line of sight channel model with
hi,mi = d
−µ
2
i,mi
ejφi,mi with di,mi the distance between user i
and its destination mi, µ the pathloss exponent, and φi,mi the
phase offset. A similar model is used for the user-eavesdropper
channel.
For multiple access, we consider a TDMA transmission,
whereby, in a non-cooperative manner, each user occupies a
single time slot. Within a single slot, the maximum amount
of reliable information transmitted from the user i occupying
the slot to its destination mi is quantified through the secrecy
capacity Ci,mi defined as follows [6]:
Ci,mi =
(
Cdi,mi − max1≤k≤K
Cei,k
)+
, (1)
where Cdi,mi is the Shannon capacity for the transmission
between user i and its destination mi ∈ M, Cei,k is the
Shannon capacity of user i at the eavesdropper k ∈ K, and
a+ , max (a, 0).
In a non-cooperative approach, due to the broadcast nature of
the wireless channel, the transmission of the users can be over-
heard by the eavesdroppers which reduces their secrecy capacity
as clearly expressed in (1). For improving their performance
and increasing their secrecy capacity, the users can collaborate
by forming cooperative groups known as coalitions. Within
every coalition, the users can utilize collaborative beamforming
techniques for improving their secrecy capacities. In this context,
every user i belonging to a coalition S will use the cooperation
protocol of [10] by dividing its slot into two durations:
1) In the first duration, user i broadcasts its information to the
other members of coalition S.
2) In the second duration, coalitions S performs collaborative
beamforming. In other words, all the members of coalition
S relay a weighted version of user i’s signal to its destina-
tion.
The objective of this cooperation is to null the signal at the
eavesdroppers, i.e., impose Cei,k = 0, ∀k ∈ K, hence, improving
the secrecy capacity in (1) [10]. Each coalition S ⊆ N that
forms in the network is able to transmit within all the time slots
previously held by its users. Thus, in the presence of cooperating
coalitions, the TDMA system schedules one coalition per time
slot. During a given slot, the coalition acts as a single entity
for transmitting the data of the user that owns the slot. An
illustration of this model is shown in Figure 1 for N = 9 users,
M = 2 destinations, and K = 2 eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, we define a fixed transmit power per time slot P˜
which constrains all the users that are transmitting within a given
slot. In a non-cooperative manner, this power constraint applies
to the single user occupying the slot, while in a cooperative
manner this same power constraint applies to the entire coalition
occupying the slot. Such a power assumption is typical in
TDMA systems comprising mobile users and is a direct result
of ergodicity and the time varying user locations [12–14]. For
every coalition S, during the time slot owned by user i ∈ S,
user i utilizes a portion of the available power P˜ for information
exchange (first stage) while the remaining portion PSi is used by
the coalition S to transmit the actual data to the destination mi of
user i (second stage). For information exchange, user i ∈ S can
broadcast its information to the farthest user iˆ ∈ S, by doing so
all the other members of S can also obtain the information due
to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel. This information
exchange incurs a power cost P¯i,ˆi given by
P¯i,ˆi =
ν0 · σ2
qi,ˆi
, (2)
where ν0 is a target average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for
information exchange, σ2 is the noise variance and qi,ˆi = 1/d
µ
i,ˆi
is the path loss between users i and iˆ with di,ˆi the distance
between them. The remaining power that coalition S utilizes for
the transmission of the data of user i during the remaining time
of this user’s slot is
PSi = (P˜ − P¯i,ˆi)
+ (3)
For every coalition S, during the transmission of the data
of user i to its destination, the coalition members can weigh
their signals in a way to completely null the signal at the
eavesdroppers. We define, for a coalition S, the |S| × 1 vectors
hS = [hi1,m1 , . . . , hi|S|,m|S| ]
H
, gkS = [gi1,k, . . . , gi|S|,k]
H
, and
wS = [wi1 , . . . , wi|S| ]
H which represent, respectively, the “user-
destination” channels, “user-eavesdropper k” channels, and the
signal weights. By nulling the signals at the eavesdropper
through cooperation within coalition S, the secrecy capacity (1)
achieved by user i ∈ S at its destination mi during user i’s time
slot becomes [10, Eq. (14)]
CSi,mi =
1
2
log2 (1 +
(woptS )
HRSw
opt
S
σ2
), (4)
where RS = hShHS , σ2 is the noise variance, and w
opt
S is the
weight vector that maximizes the secrecy capacity while nulling
the signal at the eavesdropper and is given in [10, Eq.(20)] by
w
opt
S = β
S
i G
H
S (GSG
H
S )
−1e with GS = [hS , g1S , . . . , gKS ]H
a (K + 1) × |S| matrix, βSi =
√
PSi
eH(GSGHS )
−1e
a scalar and
e = [1,01×K ]
H a (K + 1) × 1 vector. In (4), the factor 12
accounts for the fact that half of the slot of user i is reserved
for information exchange.
Having adequately presented the model for physical layer
security, the remainder of this paper is devoted to investigate
how a network of users can cooperate, through the protocol
described in this section, and improve the security of their
wireless transmission, i.e., their secrecy capacity.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY AS A COALITIONAL GAME
In this section, we formulate the physical layer security model
of the previous section as a coalitional game and we investigate
its properties. For instance, the proposed PHY security problem
is modeled as a coalitional game with a non-transferable utility
defined as [15]:
Definition 1: A coalitional game with non-transferable utility
is defined by a pair (N , V ) where N is the set of players and
V is a mapping such that for every coalition S ⊆ N , V (S) is
a closed convex subset of R|S| that contains the payoff vectors
that players in S can achieve.
For the proposed physical layer security problem, given a
coalition S and denoting by φi(S) the payoff of user i ∈ S
during its time slot, we define the coalitional value set, i.e., the
mapping V as follows
V (S) = {φ(S) ∈ R|S|| ∀i ∈ S φi(S) = (vi(S)− ci(S))
+
if PSi > 0, and φi(S) = −∞ otherwise.},
(5)
where vi(S) = CSi,mi is the gain in terms of secrecy capacity
for user i ∈ S given by (4) while taking into account the
available power PSi in (3) and ci(S) is a secrecy cost function
that captures the loss for user i ∈ S, in terms of secrecy capacity,
that occurs during information exchange. Note that, when all
the power is spent for information exchange, the payoff φi(S)
of user i is set to −∞ since, in this case, the user has clearly
no interest in cooperating.
With regard to the secrecy cost function ci(S), when a
user i ∈ S sends its information to the farthest user iˆ ∈ S
using a power level P¯i,ˆi, the eavesdroppers can overhear the
transmission. This security loss is quantified by the capacity at
the eavesdroppers resulting from the information exchange and
which, for a particular eavedropper k ∈ K, is given by
Cˆei,k =
1
2
log (1 +
P¯i,ˆi · |gi,k|
2
σ2
), (6)
Given this security loss, the cost function c(S) can be defined
as
ci(S) = max (Cˆ
e
i,1, . . . , Cˆ
e
i,K). (7)
In a nutshell, the proposed coalitional value defined in (5)
considers the benefit from cooperation, in terms of improved
secrecy capacity, while taking into account the costs in terms of
reduced power for transmission due to the power fraction used
for information exchange as well as the secrecy capacity loss
due to the eavesdroppers overhearing the transmission of the
users during the information exchange phase.
Subsequently, the proposed physical layer security coopera-
tion problem can be easily formulated as a coalitional game
with non-transferable utility as per the following property:
Property 1: Given the mapping V in (5), whenever the users
transmit at their maximum rate (i.e. capacity), the proposed PHY
security cooperation problem is a (N , V ) non-transferable utility
coalitional game.
Proof: Immediate result from the fact that when the users
transmit at their maximum rate, the mapping V (S) defined in (5)
is a singleton set, and hence, closed and convex. Consequently,
the proposed coalitional game model has a non-transferable
utility V (S) expressed by (5)
In general, coalitional game based problems seek to charac-
terize the properties and stability of the grand coalition of all
players since it is generally assumed that the grand coalition
maximizes the utilities of the players [15]. In our case, although
cooperation improves the secrecy capacity for the users in the
TDMA network; the costs in terms of:
1) The fraction of power spent for information exchange as
per (3) and,
2) the secrecy loss during information exchange as per (7)
strongly limit the cooperation gains. Therefore, for the proposed
(N , v) coalitional game we have:
Property 2: For the proposed (N , V ) coalitional game, the
grand coalition of all the users seldom forms due to the various
costs for information exchange. Instead, disjoint independent
coalitions will form in the network.
Proof: Given a number of users positioned at different
location within the wireless network, cooperation for improving
the secrecy capacity entails costs, as previously mentioned,
in terms of secrecy loss and power loss during information
exchange as per (2) and (7). Hence, in a practical wireless
network where the users are located at different positions, it is
highly likely that, when they attempt to cooperate for forming
the grand coalition N of all users, either: (i)- there exists a
pair of users i, j ∈ N that are distant enough to require an
information power cost of P˜ hence they have no incentive to
join the grand coalition, or (ii)- there exists a user i ∈ N with
the payoff of i in the grand coalition φi(N ) = 0 due to the
secrecy loss as captured by (7), hence this user i has incentive
to deviate from the grand coalitions. Clearly, by accounting for
the various cooperation costs, the grand coalition of all users
will seldom form (it only forms if all users are very close, which
is unrealistic in a large scale wireless network) and hence, the
network structure consists of disjoint independent coalitions.
Due to this property, traditional solution concepts for coali-
tional games, such as the core [15], may not be applicable.
In fact, in order for the core to exist, as a solution concept,
a coalitional game must ensure that the grand coalition, i.e., the
coalition of all players will form. However, as seen in Figure 1
and corroborated by Property 2, in general, due to the cost for
coalition formation, the grand coalition will not form. Instead,
independent and disjoint coalitions appear in the network as a
result of the collaborative beamforming process. In this regard,
the proposed game is classified as a coalition formation game,
and the objective is to find the coalitional structure that will form
in the network, instead of finding only a solution concept, such
as the core, which aims mainly at stabilizing the grand coalition.
Furthermore, for the proposed (N , V ) coalition formation
game, a constraint on the coalition size, imposed by the nature
of the cooperation protocol exists as follows:
Remark 1: For the proposed (N , V ) coalition formation
game, the size of any coalition S ⊆ N that will form in the
network must satisfy |S| > K .
This is a direct result of the fact that, for nulling K eaves-
droppers, at least K + 1 users must cooperate, otherwise, no
weight vector can be found to maximize (1) while nulling the
signal at the eavesdroppers.
IV. DISTRIBUTED COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
A. Coalition Formation Algorithm
Coalition formation has been a topic of high interest in game
theory [16–19]. The goal is to find algorithms for characterizing
the coalitional structures that form in a network where the grand
coalition is not optimal. For instance, using game theoretical
techniques from coalition formation games, we devise an algo-
rithm for distributed coalition formation algorithm in the pro-
posed (N , V ) PHY security cooperative game. For constructing
a coalition formation process suitable to the proposed game, we
require the following definitions [18]
Definition 2: A collection of coalitions, denoted by S, is
defined as the set S = {S1, . . . , Sl} of mutually disjoint
coalitions Si ⊂ N . In other words, a collection is any arbitrary
group of disjoint coalitions Si of N not necessarily spanning all
players of N . If the collection spans all the players of N ; that
is
⋃l
j=1 Sj = N , the collection is a partition of N .
Definition 3: A preference operator or comparison relation
⊲ is an order defined for comparing two collections R =
{R1, . . . , Rl} and S = {S1, . . . , Sp} that are partitions of the
same subset A ⊆ N (i.e. same players in R and S). Therefore,
R ⊲ S implies that the way R partitions A is preferred to the
way S partitions A.
Various well known orders can be used as comparison re-
lations in different scenarios [18], [19]. These orders can be
divided into two main categories: coalition value orders and
individual value orders. Coalition value orders compare two col-
lections (or partitions) using the value function of the coalitions
inside these collections (suitable for games with transferable
utilities) while individual value orders perform the comparison
using the individual payoffs of every user. For the individual
orders, two collections R and S are seen as two vectors of
individual payoffs of the same length (corresponding to the
total number of players) where each element of these payoff
vectors corresponds to the utility received by the players in each
coalition Ri ∈ R and Si ∈ S. In this context, individual value
orders are quite suitable for non-transferable utility games such
as the proposed game. Hence, for the PHY security coalition
formation game, we define the following individual order that
will be used in the coalition formation algorithm
Definition 4: Consider two collections R = {R1, . . . , Rl}
and S = {S1, . . . , Sm} that are partitions of the same subset
A ⊆ N (same players in R and S). For a collection R =
{R1, . . . , Rl}, let the utility of a player j in a coalition Rj ∈ R
be denoted by Φj(R) = φj(Rj) ∈ V (Rj). R is preferred over
S by Pareto order, written as R⊲ S, iff
R⊲ S ⇐⇒ {Φj(R) ≥ Φj(S) ∀ j ∈ R,S},
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player k.
In other words, a collection is preferred by the players over
another collection, if at least one player is able to improve
its payoff without hurting the other players. Subsequently, for
performing autonomous coalition formation between the users
in the proposed PHY security game, we construct a distributed
algorithm based on two simple rules denoted as “merge” and
“split” [18] defined as follows.
Definition 5: Merge Rule - Merge any set of coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sl} whenever the merged form is preferred by the
players, i.e., where
{
l⋃
j=1
Sj}⊲ {S1, . . . , Sl},
TABLE I
ONE ROUND OF THE PROPOSED PHY SECURITY COALITION FORMATION
ALGORITHM
Initial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the beginning
of all time T = N = {1, . . . , N} with non-cooperative users).
Three phases in each round of the coalition formation algorithm
Phase 1 - Neighbor Discovery:
a) Each coalition surveys its neighborhood for candidate partners.
b) For every coalition Ti, the candidate partners lie in the area
represented by the intersection of |Ti| circles with centers j ∈ Ti
and radii determined by the distance where the power for
information exchange does not exceed P˜ for any user
(easily computed through (2)).
Phase 2 - Adaptive Coalition Formation:
In this phase, coalition formation using merge-and-split occurs.
repeat
a) F = Merge(T ); coalitions in T decide to merge based on
the algorithm of Section IV-A.
b) T = Split(F ); coalitions in F decide to split based on
the Pareto order.
until merge-and-split terminates.
Phase 3 - Secure Transmission:
Each coalition’s users exchange their information and transmit
their data within their allotted slots.
The above three phases are repeated periodically during the
network operation, allowing a topology that is adaptive to en-
vironmental changes such as mobility.
therefore, {S1, . . . , Sl} → {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}.
Definition 6: Split Rule - Split any coalition
⋃l
j=1 Sj when-
ever a split form is preferred by the players, i.e., where
{S1, . . . , Sl}⊲ {
l⋃
j=1
Sj},
thus, {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} → {S1, . . . , Sl}.
Using the above rules, multiple coalitions can merge into a
larger coalition if merging yields a preferred collection based
on the Pareto order. This implies that a group of users can
agree to form a larger coalition, if at least one of the users
improves its payoff without decreasing the utilities of any of the
other users. Similarly, an existing coalition can decide to split
into smaller coalitions if splitting yields a preferred collection
by Pareto order. The rationale behind these rules is that, once
the users agree to sign a merge agreement, this agreement can
only be broken if all the users approve. This is a family of
coalition formation games known as coalition formation games
with partially reversible agreements [16]. Using the rules of
merge and split is highly suitable for the proposed PHY security
game due to many reasons. For instance, each merge or split
decision can be taken in a distributed manner by each individual
user or by each already formed coalition. Further, it is shown
in [18] that any arbitrary iteration of merge and split rules
terminates, hence these rules can be used as building blocks
in a coalition formation process for the PHY security game.
Accordingly, for the proposed PHY security game, we con-
struct a coalition formation algorithm based on merge-and-split
and divided into three phases: neighbor discovery, adaptive
coalition formation, and transmission. In the neighbor discovery
phase (Phase 1), each coalition (or user) surveys its environment
in order to find possible cooperation candidates. For a coalition
Sk the area that is surveyed for discovery is the intersection
of |Sk| circles, centered at the coalition members with each
circle’s radius given by the maximum distance r¯i (for the circle
centered at i ∈ Sk) within which the power cost for user
i as given by (2) does not exceed the total available power
P˜ . This area is determined by the fact that, if a number of
coalitions {S1, . . . , Sm} attempt to merge into a new coalition
G = ∪mi=1Si which contains a member i ∈ G such that the
power for information exchange needed by i exceeds P˜ , then
the payoff of i goes to −∞ as per (5) and the Pareto order can
never be verified. Clearly, as the number of users in a coalition
increases, the number of circles increases, reducing the area
where possible cooperation partners can be found. This implies
that, as the size of a coalition grows, the possibility of adding
new users decreases, and hence, the complexity of performing
merge also decreases.
Following Phase 1, the adaptive coalition formation
phase (Phase 2) begins, whereby the users interact for assessing
whether to form new coalitions with their neighbors or whether
to break their current coalition. For this purpose, an iteration of
sequential merge-and-split rules occurs in the network, whereby
each coalition decides to merge (or split) depending on the utility
improvement that merging (or splitting) yields. Starting from an
initial network partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N , any random
coalition (individual user) can start with the merge process. The
coalition Ti ∈ T which debuts the merge process starts by
enumerating, sequentially, the possible coalitions, of size greater
than K (Remark 1), that it can form with the neighbors that
were discovered in Phase 1. On one hand, if a new coalition
T˜i which is preferred by the users through Pareto order is
identified, this coalition will form by a merge agreement of all
its members. Hence, the merge ends by a final merged coalition
T finali composed of Ti and one or several of coalitions in its
vicinity. On the other hand, if Ti is unable to merge with any
of the discovered partners, it ends its search and T finali = Ti.
The algorithm is repeated for the remaining Ti ∈ T until all
the coalitions have made their merge decisions, resulting in a
final partition F . Following the merge process, the coalitions in
the resulting partition F are next subject to split operations,
if any is possible. In the proposed PHY security problem,
the coalitions are only interested in splitting into structures
that include either singleton users or coalitions of size larger
than K or both (Remark 1). Similar to merge, the split is
a local decision to each coalition. An iteration consisting of
multiple successive merge-and-split operations is repeated until
it terminates. The termination of an iteration of merge and split
rules is guaranteed as shown in [18]. It must be stressed that the
merge or split decisions can be taken in a distributed way by
the users/coalitions without relying on any centralized entity.
In the final transmission phase (Phase 3), the coalitions
exchange their information and begin their secure transmission
towards their corresponding destinations, in a TDMA manner,
one coalition per slot. Every slot is owned by a user who
transmits its data with the help of its coalition partners, if that
user belongs to a coalition. Hence, in this phase, the user perform
the actual beamforming, while transmitting the data of every user
within its corresponding slot. Each run of the proposed algorithm
consists of these three phases, and is summarized in Table I. As
time evolves and the users, eavesdroppers and destinations move
(or new users or eavesdroppers enter/leave the network), the
users can autonomously self-organize and adapt the network’s
topology through appropriate merge-and-split decisions during
Phase 2. This adaptation to environmental changes is ensured
by enabling the users to run the adaptive coalition formation
phase periodically in the network.
The proposed algorithm in Table I can be implemented in
a distributed manner. As the user can detect the strength of
other users’ uplink signals (through techniques similar to those
used in the ad hoc routing discovery), nearby coalitions can be
discovered in Phase 1. In fact, during Phase 1, each coalition
in the network can easily work out the area within which
candidates for merge can be found, as previously explained in
this section. Once the neighbors are discovered, the coalitions
can perform merge operations based on the Pareto order in
Phase 2. Moreover, each formed coalition can also internally
decides to split if its members find a split form by Pareto order.
By using a control channel, the distributed users can exchange
some channel information and then and then cooperate using our
model (exchange data information if needed, form coalition then
transmit). Note that, in this paper, we assume that the users have
perfect knowledge of the channels to the eavesdroppers which is
an assumption used in most PHY security related literature, and
as explained in [10] this channel information can be obtained
by the users through a constant monitoring of the behavior of
the eavesdroppers.
B. Partition Stability
The result of the proposed algorithm in Table I is a network
partition composed of disjoint independent coalitions. The sta-
bility of this network partition can be investigated using the
concept of a defection function [18].
Definition 7: A defection function D is a function which
associates with each partition T of N a group of collections
in N . A partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N is D-stable if no
group of players is interested in leaving T when the players
who leave can only form the collections allowed by D.
We are interested in two defection functions [17–19]. First,
the Dhp function which associates with each partition T of N
the group of all partitions of N that can form through merge or
split and the Dc function which associates with each partition
T of N the group of all collections in N . This function allows
any group of players to leave the partition T of N through any
operation and create an arbitrary collection in N . Two forms
of stability stem from these definitions: Dhp stability and a
stronger Dc stability. A partition T is Dhp-stable, if no player
in T is interested in leaving T through merge-and-split to form
other partitions in N ; while a partition T is Dc-stable, if no
player in T is interested in leaving T through any operation
(not necessarily merge or split) to form other collections in N .
Hence, a partition is Dhp-stable if no coalition has an incentive
to split or merge. For instance, a partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl}
is Dhp-stable, if the following two necessary and sufficient
conditions are met [18], [17] (⋫ is the non-preference operator,
opposite of ⊲):
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for each partition
{R1, . . . , Rm} of Ti ∈ T we have
{R1, . . . , Rm} ⋫ Ti; (8)
2) For each S ⊆ {1, . . . , l} we have⋃
i∈S
Ti ⋫ {Ti|i ∈ S}, (9)
The above conditions are the generalized form (through the
framework of [18]) of the Dhp stability conditions presented
in [17]. Using this definition of Dhp stability, we have
Theorem 1: Every partition resulting from our proposed
coalition formation algorithm is Dhp-stable.
Proof: Consider a partition T resulting from the con-
vergence of an iteration of merge-and-split operations such
as in the algorithm of Table I, then no coalition in T can
leave this partition through merge or split. For instance, assume
T = {T1, . . . , Tl} is the partition resulting from the proposed
merge-and-split algorithm. If for any i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and for any
partition {S1, . . . , Sm} of Ti we assume that {S1, . . . , Sm}⊲Ti
then the partition T can still be modified through the application
of the split rule on Ti contradicting with the fact that T resulted
from a termination of the merge-and-split iteration; therefore
{S1, . . . , Sm} ⋫ Ti (first Dhp stability condition verified). A
similar reasoning is applicable in order to prove that T verifies
the second condition; since otherwise a merge rule would still
be applicable.
Furthermore, a Dc-stable partition T is characterized by
being a strongly stable partition, which satisfies the following
properties:
1) A Dc-stable partition is Dhp-stable.
2) A Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of any iteration
of merge-and-split.
3) A Dc-stable partition T is a unique ⊲-maximal partition,
that is for all partitions T ′ 6= T of N , T ⊲ T ′. In the case
where ⊲ represents the Pareto order, this implies that the
Dc-stable partition T is the partition that presents a Pareto
optimal utility distribution for all the players.
Clearly, it is desirable that the network self-organizes unto
a Dc-stable partition. However, the existence of a Dc-stable
partition is not always guaranteed [18]. The Dc-stable partition
T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of the whole space N exists if a partition
of N that verifies the following two necessary and sufficient
conditions exists [18]:
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint coalitions
S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪S2} ⊆ Ti we have {S1 ∪S2}⊲
{S1, S2}.
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Fig. 2. A snapshot of a coalitional structure resulting from our proposed coalition
formation algorithm for a network with N = 15 users, M = 2 destinations and
K = 2 eavedroppers.
2) For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} a coalition G ⊂ N
formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T is T -
incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have G ⊂ Ti.
In summary, Dc-stability requires that for all T -incompatible
coalitions {G}[T ] ⊲ {G} where {G}[T ] = {G ∩ Ti ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , l}} is the projection of coalition G on T . If no partition
of N can satisfy these conditions, then no Dc-stable partition of
N exists. Nevertheless, we have
Lemma 1: For the proposed (N , v) PHY security coalitional
game, the proposed algorithm of Table I converges to the optimal
Dc-stable partition, if such a partition exists. Otherwise, the final
network partition is Dhp-stable.
Proof: The proof is a consequence of Theorem 1 and
the fact that the Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of
any merge-and-split iteration [18] which is the case with any
partition resulting from our algorithm.
Moreover, for the proposed game, the existence of the Dc-
stable partition cannot be always guaranteed. For instance, for
verifying the first condition for existence of the Dc-stable parti-
tion, the users that are members of each coalitions must verify
the Pareto order through their utility given by (5). Similarly, for
verifying the second condition of Dc stability, users belonging
to all T -incompatible coalitions in the network must verify
the Pareto order. Consequently, the existence of such a Dc-
stable partition is strongly dependent on the location of the
users and eavesdroppers through the individual utilities (secrecy
capacities). Hence, the existence of the Dc-stable partition is
closely tied to the location of the users and the eavesdroppers,
which, in a practical ad hoc wireless network are generally
random. However, the proposed algorithm will always guarantee
convergence to this optimal Dc-stable partition when it exists
as stated in Lemma 1. Whenever a Dc-stable partition does
not exist, the coalition structure resulting from the proposed
algorithm will be Dhp-stable (no coalition or individual user
is able to merge or split any further).
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, a square network of 2.5 km × 2.5 km
is set up with the users, eavesdroppers, and destinations ran-
domly deployed within this area1. In this network, the users
are always assigned to the closest destination, although other
user-destination assignments can be used without any loss of
generality in the proposed coalition formation algorithm. The
simulation parameters used are as follows. First, the power
constraint per slot is P˜ = 10 mW, the noise level is −90 dBm,
and the SNR for information exchange is ν0 = 10 dB which
implies a neighbor discovery circle radius of 1 km per user. For
the channel model, the propagation loss is set to α = 3.
In Figure 2, we show a snapshot of the network structure
resulting from the proposed coalition formation algorithm for a
randomly deployed network with N = 15 users, M = 2 destina-
tions, and K = 2 eavesdroppers. This figure shows how the users
self-organize into 6 coalitions with the size of each coalition
larger than K or equal to 1. For example, Users 4 and 15, having
no suitable partners for forming a coalition of size larger than 2,
do not cooperate. The coalition formation process is a result of
Pareto order agreements for merge (or split) between the users.
For example, coalition {5, 8, 10, 13} formed since all the users
agree on its formation due to the fact that V ({5, 8, 10, 13}) =
{φ({5, 8, 10, 13}) = [0.356 0.8952 1.7235 0.6213]} which is
a clear improvement on the non-cooperative utility which was
0 for all four users (due to proximity to eavesdropper 2). In a
nutshell, this figure shows how the users can self-organize into
disjoint independent coalition for improving the PHY security
of their wireless transmission.
In Figure 3 we show how the algorithm handles mobility
through appropriate coalition formation decisions. For this pur-
pose, the network setup of Figure 2 is considered while User
1This general network setting simulates a broad range of network types
ranging from ad hoc networks, to sensor networks, WLAN networks as well
as broadband or cellular networks.
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capacity) as a function of the network size N for M = 2 destinations and
K = 2 eavesdroppers.
12 is moving horizontally for 1.1 km in the direction of the
negative x-axis. First of all, User 12 starts getting closer to its
receiver (destination 2), and hence, it improves its utility. In
the meantime, the utilities of User 12’s partners (Users 3 and
11) drop due to the increasing cost. As long as the distance
covered by User 12 is less than 0.2 km, the coalition of Users
1 and 6 can still bring mutual benefits to all three users. After
that, splitting occurs by a mutual agreement and all three users
transmit independently. When User 12 moves about 0.8 km, it
begins to distance itself from its receiver and its utility begins to
decrease. When the distance covered by User 12 reaches about
1 km, it will be beneficial to Users 12, 4, and 15 to form
a 3-user coalition through the merge rule since they improve
their utilities from φ4({4}) = 0.2577, φ12({12}) = 0.7638, and
φ15({15}) = 0 in a non-cooperative manner to V ({4, 12, 15}) =
{φ({4, 12, 15}) = [1.7618 1.0169 0.6227]}.
In Figure 4 we show the performance, in terms of average
utility (secrecy capacity) per user, as a function of the network
size N . The results are averaged over the random positions of
the users, eavesdroppers and destinations. For cooperation with
coalitions, the average individual utility increases with the num-
ber of users. This is interpreted by the fact that as the number of
users N increases, the probability of finding candidate partners
to form coalitions with increases for every user. In contrast, for
the non-cooperative approach an almost constant performance is
noted. Finally, as easily seen in Figure 4 cooperation presents
a clear performance advantage at all network sizes reaching
up to 25.32% improvement of the average user utility (secrecy
capacity) at N = 45.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the user behavior, topology, and
dynamics of a network of users that interact in order to improve
their secrecy capacity through cooperation. We formulate the
problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and propose a
distributed and adaptive coalition formation algorithm. Through
the proposed algorithm, the mobile users can autonomously take
the decision to form or break cooperative coalitions through well
suited rules from cooperative games while maximizing their se-
crecy capacity taking into account various costs for information
exchange. We characterize the network structure resulting from
the proposed algorithm, study its stability, and analyze the self-
adaptation of the topology to environmental changes such as
mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm
allows the users to self-organize while improving the average
secrecy capacity per user up to 25.32% relative to the non-
cooperative case.
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